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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) Docket Nb. 860493 
BILLY E. NOON, ) 
) Category No. 2 
Defendant, Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether at the close of the City's evidence, the Trial Court 
properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of 
probably cause to effect an arrest, and whether^  the District 
Court properly upheld said ruling. 
Whether defendant's counsel effectively and adequately 
represented the defendant, thus affording defendant a fair trial, 
and whether the District Court's ruling stating so, was proper. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case involving a single charge, that 
being the traffic offense of driving while und|er the influence of 
alcohol, a class B misdemeanor. 
The violation and the arrest occurred on November 30, 1985 
within Layton City. The matter was set for a jury trial in the 
i 
Fourth Circuit Court, Layton Department of the Davis County 
District Court, before the Honorable Judge K. Roger Bean. The 
jury trial was held March 4, 1986 and at the conclusion thereof 
1 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the judge entered a 
conviction pursuant thereto. 
On April 23, 1986 defendant's motion for arrest of judgment 
and order of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial was 
heard before Judge Bean. After hearing argument and reviewing 
the file said motion was denied. 
Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Second District Court. 
Briefs were filed and oral arguments presented to the Honorable 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby. The District Court upheld the verdict 
of the Circuit Court and announced that ruling July 25, 1986. 
Defendant now makes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the late evening hours of November 30, 1985, the 
defendant drove into the parking lot of the Circle K store just 
west of the corner of Antelope Drive and Main Street, Layton 
City, Utah. (Tr. 22). The defendant drove the vehicle into the 
parking lot in such a manner that the Circle K employee's 
attention was immediately drawn to the vehicle as its lights 
flashed vertically as the vehicle crossed the driveway approach. 
(Tr. 3^). Defendant then entered in the parking lot and 
continued at such a rate of speed that the same employee thought 
the vehicle would come right into the store. The employee, Matt 
Wilhelm, did not know how, but somehow defendant was able to get 
the vehicle stopped. (Tr. 22). There were no customers in the 
store and no other vehicles in the parking lot and Mr. Wilhelmfs 
eyes were "fixed" on the defendant's car. (Tr. 24). Defendant 
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was the sole occupant of the vehicle. (Tr. 23, 148). 
As the defendant entered the store, Mr. Wilhelm immediately 
began to make observations concerning the manner in which the 
defendant conducted himself. (Tr. 25). The defendant was 
walking awkwardly, his speech was slurred, he could not control 
his cup of coffee and there was an odor of alcohol. (Tr. 25, 26). 
The defendant could hardly walk, and he was stumbling. (Tr. 27, 
38, 46). 
Mr. Wilhelm, having no doubt in his mind who was driving the 
vehicle (Tr. 44), and having observed defendant's condition, 
became concerned about the potential results of that combination 
and notified the police. (Tr. 26). 
While waiting for the police to arrive, Mr. Wilhelm 
continued to attempt conversing with defendant| in order to delay 
him so he would not "drive off." (Tr. 28). Shortly thereafter, 
the officers arrived and directly went up to Mr. Wilhelm to 
obtain his information concerning the events lleading up to his 
notifying the police. Before approaching defendant, they made 
sure that Mr. Wilhelm had seen defendant driving, that the 
witness could have seen what he claims he saw and that it was the 
same individual that was still in the store. (Tr. 28, 55-57, 
74-77, 90, 92). After being satisfied that Mif. Wilhelm was quite 
positive (Tr. 57), the officers approached and began making their 
own observations. (Tr. 44, 58-60, 63-66, 78-80, 93-96, 105-108, 
118-127, 156). 
Based on those observations, their training and experience, 
the defendant's characteristics, the presence of one car and one 
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customer and the corroborating information of Mr, Wilhelm, the 
defendant was placed under arrest for driving a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol. (Tr. 63, 67, 140). 
Defendant was then transported to the Layton Police 
Department and was requested to submit to a chemical test of a 
breath sample. (Tr. 68). Defendant refused to submit to the 
test. (Tr. 69, 70, 84, 85, 98, 99). 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable Judge K. 
Roger Bean on March 4, 1986, and at the conclusion thereof, the 
defendant was adjudged guilty of driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, and a conviction was entered 
accordingly. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
As set forth in both state statute and case law pursuant to 
said statute, the officers had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. Although 
the officers did not see the defendant drive, they had contact 
with the defendant a very short time after the driving had 
occurred and noticed his extremely intoxicated state. Further, 
prior to their contact with defendant they spoke with a witness 
who positively placed defendant as the driver of the vehicle. 
Defendant's arrest was based on probable cause. 
Defendant's trial counsel more than satisfied the minimal 
performance requirements. It is obvious from the record that he 
was familiar with these type of trials. Defendant has failed to 
4 
establish that trial counsel's performance was ineffective or 
that the results would have been different. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION I 
THE TRIAL AND DISTRICT COURTS CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLY CAUSE TO ARREST 
DEFENDANT. 
Defendant's initial assignment of error is that both lower 
courts erred in ruling that there was probably cause to arrest 
the defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. The 
lower court's rulings are correct as they are founded on state 
law and this Court's interpretations of said laws. 
State statute specifically provides the standard an officer 
may use in effectuating an arrest for a violation of the "driving 
under the influence" statute. This standard, set forth in 
§41-6-44(8), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and provides 
that: 
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for violation of this section when the 
the officer has probable cause to believe the 
violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the violation was committed by 
the person. 
Admittedly, the officers did not observe the defendant 
driving a motor vehicle. That is not fatal to this case, in 
fact, such a situation was contemplated by the drafters of this 
statute as is indicated by the phrase "although not in his 
presence . . . ." The Utah State Supreme Court has construed 
this statute and applied it to facts not unlike those in the case 
at bar. In State v. Bryan, Utah, 395 P.2d 539 (1964), the 
Defendant was involved in an automobile accident. The officers 
arrived at the scene shortly thereafter to find Defendant sitting 
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on the curb. The officers did not see Bryan driving the vehicle 
and the only offense committed in the officers' presence was 
public intoxication. Bryan, supra at 540. That is precisely the 
situation in the case at bar. However, in Bryan, after the 
Defendant was transported to the hospital the officers placed him 
under arrest for driving while intoxicated. The Court ruled that 
the arrest was lawful regardless of the facts that the arrest was 
delayed and that the offense did not take place in the officers1 
presence. Bryan, supra, at 540. In the case at bar, the facts 
available and known by the police officer provide even a stronger 
foundation for arrest than that in Bryan, as herein the officers 
had direct evidence that the defendant was driving. (Tr. 
22,23,44). 
Defendant has at least conceded that the officer had 
probable cause to arrest defendant for public intoxication. 
(Defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities in support of 
appeal to District Court, p.6). Thus, the scelnario in Bryan was 
nearly followed herein, but instead of delaying the arrest, the 
officers herein had the necessary probable cause at the initial 
scene. 
Defendant claims that the City failed to account for 
defendant's activities from the time he arrived at the store 
until the officers arrived. This, according tio defendant, is 
fatal to the case since a possible alternate explanation for 
defendant's intoxicated state exists and that this renders the 
conviction void as defendant "could have" consumed the alcohol at 
the store. First of all, a substantial amount of defendant's 
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activities in this short period of time were indeed accounted for. 
Defendant entered the store and "attempted to buy a cup of 
coffee," (Tr, 25)- As defendant testified, it was in a paper 
cup (Tr. 148), presumably the same cup Officer Cline observed him 
holding. (Tr. 91). Also, during this period of time, the 
defendant returned to his vehicle, turned off the lights and 
tried to close the trunk (Tr. 25, 26), tried to explain to Mr. 
Wilhelm the problem with the trunk (Tr. 26, 27), and was being 
observed by Mr. Wilhelm and continued conversation was attempted. 
(Tr. 27, 28). 
In applying the "probable cause" standard to the case at 
bar, it is clear that the standard was satisfied by the officers 
at the time of arrest. That standard, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in State v. Hatcher, Utah, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972), is 
to be objective, as follows: 
whether from the facts known to the officer, 
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense. 
Hatcher, supra. 
In applying that standard to this case, the facts known to 
the officer were that the defendant was extremely intoxicated, in 
a public place, was the only customer on the premises and there 
was only one car in the parking lot. The information received 
from the eyewitness, Mr. Wilhelm, included that defendant was the 
driver of that vehicle, was the sole occupant of that vehicle, 
drove into the parking lot at an alarming speed and an admission 
that it was defendant's vehicle. This latter type of information 
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is analogous to that given the officers in Hatcher, wherein 
solely the information from a witness was used to locate and 
arrest the Defendant therein without the officers having observed 
anything first hand. 
In the case at bar, the information given the officers by 
Mr. Wilhelm was corroborated by existing physical evidence, i.e., 
one car, one customer and an individual so intoxicated that the 
field sobriety tests were terminated for his own safety. (Tr. 
63, 95, 108, 1190). Most assuredly, in using the standard 
announced in Hatcher, supra, the facts known to the officers, 
coupled with reasonably deducted inferences, a reasonable and 
prudent person would be justified in believing'that the defendant 
committed the offense. The officers did have probable cause to 
arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol 
pursuant to §41-6-44(8), U.C.A. (1953, as amended). This Court 
should respond to defendant's contention just as it did to the 
same argument in State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554, at 556 
(1974). 
PROPOSITION II 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S CONDUCT WAS COMMENDABLE 
AND REFLECTED COMPETENCE. 
Defendant's next assignment of error is that, due to alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant was denied a fair 
trial. In support therefor, defendant has cited five (5) 
instances wherein, in the opinion of defendant, objections should 
have been interposed. Based on those five (5) instances and, in 
defendant's contention, a weak evidentiary foundation for his 
9 
conviction, the results of the trial would have been different. 
The first alleged error defendant claims counsel made was 
failure to object to the prosecutor's leading questions of Mr. 
Wilhelm. It is obvious from the record that the majority of said 
questions were preliminary in nature. Further, the questions, 
for the most part, did not suggest an answer that would not or 
could not have been elicited otherwise. 
Secondly, defendant claims that counsel's refraining from 
objecting to Mr. Wilhelm's narrative was extremely prejudicial. 
Mr. Wilhelm was testifying as to his state of mind and motivation 
for notifying the police. (Tr. 26). The objection would have 
had to have been made during the witness' response as opposed to 
the conclusion of a question. It may have been that counsel 
did not object and request for the answer to be stricken as a 
strategy to avoid actually reinforcing the statement in the 
jurors' minds. It should be noted that when the prosecutor 
attempted to elicit an additional like response, defense counsel 
did object and it was kept from the jury. However, it should be 
noted that the Court's ruling was not that the information was 
not admissible but rather, it was repetitive. Thus even if an 
initial objection had been made it may have been overruled and 
then that testimony would have been heard immediately after that 
ruling and would have been more emphasized to the jury. 
The third alleged error was counsel's refraining from 
objecting to Officer Robnett's recitation of Mr. Wilhelm's 
information to the officer. Defendant asserts that this was 
objectionable hearsay. Such evidence could have been offered for 
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other reasons, such as to show what information the officers 
received from Mr. Wilhelm as well as for corroboration of the 
witnesses' testimonies. The information contained in the 
statements had already been established directly from Mr. 
Wilhelm, rendering any alleged prejudice or harm negligible. 
The fourth alleged error by defense counsel was the allowing 
of Officer Robnett to read from a report without establishing 
need for refreshing his memory. Defense counsel most assuredly 
knew that if such an objection was made, it would be merely a 
procedural formality to establish a foundation and upon doing 
that, the possibility of the entire report bein^ admissible could 
be an undesirable result for the defense. (Rule 612, U.R.E.). 
Fifth alleged error by defense counsel was allowing Officer 
Robnett to testify concerning defendant's refusing to submit to 
the intoxilyzer test. Evidence concerning a refusal to submit to 
such a chemical test is specifically allowed by statute. 
§41-6-44.10(8) U.C.A. (1953 as amended). Further, the officer 
testified how he arrived at the opinion that defendant refused. 
Such opinion testimony is admissible under both Rules 701 and 702 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
It is clear from the record that these alleged errors, 
either singularly or cumulatively, had little, if any impact on 
the outcome of the trial. That defendant has only been able to 
find five (5) alleged errors from a transcript of 190 pages is 
indicative of defense counsel's performance. As has been 
established, appellate courts "do not second guess an attorney's 
legitimate exercise of judgment, as to trial tactics or strategy." 
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Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), citing State v. 
McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976). 
Further, when these alleged errors are viewed in relation to 
the substantial evidence supporting the verdict, the 
insignificance thereof is apparent. 
This contention is without merit. 
PROPOSITION III 
THE JURY VERDICT BELOW IS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The elements that the City was required to satisfy were that 
1) on or about the 30th day of November, 1985, defendant drove a 
vehicle; 2) that at that time, defendant was under the influence 
of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle; and 3) that these acts took place within 
Layton, Utah. 
Direct evidence established that defendant was indeed 
driving a vehicle. (Tr. 22, 23, 44). This was subsequently 
admitted to by defendant. (Tr. 148). There was no dispute that 
this all occurred within Layton City. (Tr. 50). As for the 
element of defendant's degree of impairment,Mr. Wilhelm and the 
three officers independently concluded that defendant was 
extremely intoxicated and the officers opined, based on their 
training, experience and observations of defendant that he was 
not capable of safely driving a vehicle. (Tr. 65, 96, 120). 
The only remaining element was to establish that defendant 
was so intoxicated and impaired while driving the vehicle. Based 
on the above referenced direct evidence and the manner in which 
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Mr. Wilhelm saw the vehicle approach the store and with the 
proximity in time of defendant's driving and the observation of 
his intoxicated state, clearly a reasonable inference that may be 
drawn therefrom is that defendant was intoxicated while driving. 
Making such reasonable inferences based on the direct evidence is 
a proper function of the trier of fact, State y. Kazda, Utah, 392 
P.2d 686 (1964); State v. Maestas, Utah, 652 P.2d 903 (1982). 
The jurors so found. 
PROPOSITION IV 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Initially, it is the defendant's burden to establish that 
"the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime charged." State v. Kerekes, 
Utah 622 P.2d 1161 (1980), (citing State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 
P.2d 880 (1978)). This standard and language has been repeated 
and reiterated on numerous occasions and is foi^ nd again in State 
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Defendant has failed to 
satisfy this burden. 
This Court's role in reviewing appeals from criminal 
convictions has been well established. In reviewing the 
conviction, it is encumbent upon the appellate court to assume 
that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which 
support the verdict. State v. Smathers, Utah, 602 P.2d 708 
(1979). Further, on appeal the evidence, including the 
reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom, will 
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be reviewed in a manner that will support the jury verdict. 
State v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193 (1976). Finally, on 
these appeals from criminal convictions, the evidence is to be 
viewed "in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and will 
reverse only when the evidence is so unsubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not have reached the verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301 (Utah 1985), 
(citing State v. Brooks, Utah, 638 P.2d 537 (1981), and State v. 
Howell, Utah 649 P.2d 91 (1982)). 
It is obvious from the record that the evidence supporting 
the City's contention was substantial and gave the jury a solid 
foundation on which to base the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the case law set forth herein, it is clear that 
the results in case at bar are in line with the previous rulings 
announced by the State Supreme Court. The defendant's arrest was 
proper and in accordance with §41-6-44(8) U.C.A. (1953); and the 
elements of the offense were well proven by substantial and 
generally uncontested evidence. It is clear that the verdict 
herein must be affirmed. 
WHEREFORE, Layton City respectfully prays this Court 
uphold the findings of the jury, the trial court, and the 
district court and affirm the finding of guilt. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of December, 1986. 
STEVEN L GARSIDE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a s amended 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug 
or with high blood alcohol content — Criminal 
punishment — Arrest without warrant — Sus-
pension or revocation of license. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section 
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a 
. defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; imprisonment shall 
be for not fewer than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehi-
cle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, any 
imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more than one year. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is 
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in subsection (3), the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving in 
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours 
and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in 
addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose a man-
datory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more 
than 720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, 
or require the person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or the work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series 
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its dis-
cretion, order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilita-
tion facility. 
Note: §41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is identical to 
the Utah Code version 
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(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second 
conviction under this section or under 1i losc\l ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court 
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work project for not less 
than 240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. I 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or proba-
tion until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this 
section or a local ordinance similar to this section adopted m compli-
ance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1) may not be terminated and the de-
partment may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a 
result of the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction within 
five years, until the convicted person has furnished evidence satisfac-
tory to the department that all fines and fees, including fees for restitu-
tion and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been 
paid. I 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentenc-
ing court to order a convicted person to participate m an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, ob-
tain, in the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilita-
tion facility, or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabili-
tation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply to a convic-
tion for a violation of § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under 
Subsection (7), so as to require the court to render the 3ame order 
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, 
or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), 
as he would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44 
(4) and (5). 
03) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under 
§ 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is 
a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previ-
ous conviction under either § 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior 
conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-
based or other education program provided for in this section shall be 
approved by the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of § 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant 
to Subsection 41-6-43 (b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state 
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not 
there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement 
shall be an offer of proof of the facts which shows whether or not there 
was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the offense. 
1 7 . 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of 
§ 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of violating § 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or 
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, 
the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection 
(5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of 
§ 41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise convicted 
under this section, except that the department may subtract from any sus-
pension period the number of days for which a license was previously sus-
pended under § 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
§42-6-44,10 (8), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical test or tests under the provisions of this section, 
evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to 
have been committed while the person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol 
and any drug. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; 
Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible-
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulat 
evidence. 
Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh Memory. 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the 
purpose of testifying, either 
1. while testifying, or 
2. before testifying, if the court in its discretion 
determines it is necessary in the interest of 
justice, 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced 
at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the 
witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains 
matters not related to the subject matter of the 
testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, 
exercise any portions not so related, and order delivery 
of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any 
portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and 
made available to the appellate court in the event of an 
appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered 
pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make 
any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases 
when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order 
shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in 
its discretion determines that the interests of justice 
so require, declaring a mistrial. 
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Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. 
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